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GAULT'S LEGACY: DIGNITY, DUE PROCESS, AND
ADOLESCENTS' LIBERTY INTERESTS
IN LIVING DONATION
RHONDA GAY HARTMAN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In re Gault formalized the Supreme Court's recognition that
constitutional guaranties are not just for "adults alone."' The
Court interpreted the federal Constitution to require the government, in its role as parens patriae, to treat minors (i.e., persons
under eighteen) fairly when they are faced with deprivation of
their liberty interests and to facilitate their participation in decision-making processes.
Two basic principles can be distilled from Gault. First, Gault
vitalized interests in life, liberty, and property of the Due Process
Clause for all persons.2 Second, Gault established that for minors
these interests are promoted and protected by government
processes that facilitate fair treatment and include minors' participation in decisional processes affecting their lives.3 Taken
together, these principles transcend the delinquency proceeding
before the Court in Gault by emphasizing the state's parens patriae
role in devising process-oriented approaches whenever minors'
* Professor Hartman holds a faculty appointment at Duquesne University in both the School of Law and at the Center for Healthcare Ethics. She is
also affiliated with the Center for Bioethics & Health Law at the University of
Pittsburgh. The author wishes to express her gratitude to the McAnulty College
& Graduate School of Liberal Arts and to the Center for Healthcare Ethics at
Duquesne University for supporting this project. She also wishes to acknowledge with appreciation the valuable support provided by the Notre DameJournal
of Law, Ethics & Public Pohcy.
1. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). In the year preceding Gault, the
Supreme Court first recognized the concept of "children's rights" when in Kent
v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 560-65 (1966), it reversed an order by ajuvenile
court judge who certified an adolescent for trial as an adult in the absence of
any-let alone adequate-procedural safeguards. For an interesting perspective in this vein, see Monrad G. Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional
Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 167. Prior to the 1960s, the Court
had only intimated at federal Constitutional guaranties extending to minors.
See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
2. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13 ("[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor
the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.").
3. Id. at 19-26.
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constitutionally protected interests are implicated, thereby promoting dignity of minors.4
This Essay develops Gault's due process framework for application to adolescent (fourteen through seventeen years of age)
decision making about medical donation, though this framework
may be adapted to other contexts involving youths. The Essay
synthesizes due process values for process-oriented approaches to
adolescents' liberty interests and also suggests the essentials of a
legal model for adolescents' decision making about medical
donation.
Medical donation entails surgical invasion for removal of an
organ or other tissue for transfer or graft to benefit another person. Our society finds revolting and rejects any possibility of
coercing or forcing an adult to donate an organ or other tissue
against his will. 5 Yet, minors, including adolescents who are
becoming adults, are denied meaningful input concerning
whether they must or may donate an organ or tissue. As discussed below,6 maintaining bodily integrity is the very foundation
of personal liberty, but adolescents' constitutionally protected
liberty interests receive scant, if any, attention.
Although adolescents routinely donate regenerative tissues
and blood,7 the focus will be on organ donation, specifically livekidney donation.8 Technological advances for kidney removal,9
4. In Gault, the Court applied these principles to a state's delinquency
adjudication of a youth who had been committed to a correction facility for six
years but who had not been afforded proper notice of the proceedings, a privilege against self-incrimination, or counsel's assistance, all of which would have
optimized opportunity for confronting accusers prior to adjudication and commitment. Id. at 28, 31-56.
5. See National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339,
2342-45 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274 (2000)); Organ
Donation and Recovery Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 108-216, 118 Stat. 584
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273a, 274f-1 to -4 (Supp. IV 2004));
REviSED UNIF. ANATOMICAL Givr Acr
(amended 2006), 8A U.L.A. 8
(Supp. 2007); McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 92 (C.P. 1978); infta notes
64-65 and accompanying text. Federal and state legislation advance a policy of
donation based on acts of altruism.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 83-88.
7. See Bryan Shartle, Comment, ProposedLegislationfor Safely Regulating the
Increasing Number of Living Organ and Tissue Donations by Minors, 61 LA. L. REv.
433, 437 (2001) (noting blood and bone marrow are the primary tissues
donated by minors).
8. See Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and
Related Agencies Appropriationsfor 2001: HearingsBefore a Subcomm. of the H. Comm.
on Appropriations,106th Cong. 1080 (2000) (statement of'Jack Moore,Jr., Chairman, National Kidney Foundation of the National Capital Area), available at
http://www.kidney.org/news/pubpol/jackmoore.cfm
(reporting a 123%
increase in living organ donation in the last decade); see also Alvin E. Roth et al.,

20081

GAULT'S LEGACY

the rise in chronic diseases among adolescents and young
adults," ° and the grim statistic that salvageable lives are primarily
lost because demand for transplantable kidneys far exceeds the
supply" have all dramatically increased the number of kidney
donation procedures. The idea that adolescents should be living
donors of vital non-regenerative organs seems contradictory to
Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based
Preferences, 97 AM.J. ECON. REv. 828, 828 (2007) (observing that, in 2005, "6,563
kidney transplants [were] from living donors" in contrast to the 'just over 9,900
transplants of deceased donor kidneys for the over 60,000 patients waiting for
such transplants in the United States, with a median waiting time of over three
years"); Elaine R. Berg, Letter to the Editor, Living Organ Donors, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 2002, at A24 (stating that, in 2001, living donors of kidneys surpassed
the number of deceased donors for the first time).
9. Among these advances are laparoscopic nephrectomy technique and
management of graft rejection, including better antirejection drugs. Nicholas
R. Brook & Michael L. Nicholson, Non-Directed Live Kidney Donation, 368 THE
LANCET 346, 346 (2006); see also Gretchen Reynolds, Will Any Organ Do?, N.Y.
TIMES, July 10, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 37 (discussing the medical and ethical
questions raised by organ transplant advances).
10. See Karen C. Swallen et al., Overweight, Obesity, and Health-Related Quality of Life Among Adolescents: The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health,
115 PEDtATRICS 340 (2005) (finding that obesity in adolescence is linked with
poor physical quality of life).
11. See COMM. ON INCREASING RATES OF ORGAN DONATION, INST. OF MED.,
ORGAN DONATION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION 2 (James F. Childress & Catharyn
T. Liverman, eds., 2006) [hereinafter ORGAN DONATION] (stating that those
waiting for a kidney transplant constitute "more than 70 percent of the individuals on the current transplant waiting list"); Peter Coy, Death Benefits: Organ
Donor Economics, Bus. WK., Feb. 5, 2007, at 14 (emphasizing the dire situation
that is now giving rise to pragmatic responses of market incentives for donation); Reynolds, supra note 9, at 38 (underscoring the desperation in trend
toward using "marginal" organs for transplant). This shortfall has trended
toward living donation from which networks for both directed (including
paired organ exchange) and non-directed "domino paired donation" have
emerged. See ORGAN DONATION, supra, at 263-67; Brook & Nicholson, supra
note 9, at 346-47; Francis L. Delmonico, Exchanging Kidneys: Advances in LivingDonorTransplantation,350 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1812, 1812 (2004) (noting that the
use of kidney transplantation from living donors has become the dominant
approach in part because of superior outcomes and the advent of laparoscopic
nephrectomy); Faith McLellan, U.S. Surgeons Do First "Triple Swap' Kidney Transplantation, 362 LANCET 456 (2003); Robert A. Montgomery et al., Domino Paired
Kidney Donation: A Strategy to Make Best Use of Live Non-DirectedDonation, 368 THE
LANCET 419 (2006) (examining the effect of allocating a living non-directed

organ to a pool of incompatible donor-patient pairs); Susan L. Saidman et al.,
Increasing the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation by Matchingfor Two and Three
Way Exchanges, 81 TRANSPLANTATION 773 (2006) (proposing a computerized
matching protocol for use in facilitating donor exchanges that otherwise would
not readily occur); Michael T. Morley, Note, Increasing the Supply of Organsfor
Transplantation Through Paired Organ Exchanges, 21 YALE L. & POL'V REv. 221

(2003) (arguing for increased federal facilitation of paired organ exchanges).
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suppositions about their cognitive ability, vulnerability, and
immaturity.12 Notwithstanding this, adolescents do constitute a
living donor group,"5 along with younger children who are utilized by parents as living donors for siblings. 4
Adolescents' medical donation decisions, whether for family
members or friends, are neither insignificant nor inconsequential. Yet, the subject has scarcely drawn scholarly attention, let
alone debate.1" Important issues include the decision-making
process and the extent to which adolescents' desires either to
donate or to decline to donate are respected. Adolescent donation is virtually absent from the policy dialogue surrounding
transplantation, and laws governing organ donation and transplant omit altogether reference to the complex considerations
surrounding minors as living donors. Not only is donation of tissue and organs by adolescents overlooked by federal and state
legislation, but reported case law authorizing parents' decisions
to compel donation from their children for benefit to siblings is
also both inapposite to the complexities of adolescent medical
donation and inadequate to resolve the issues attendant thereto.
While not addressing the ethical or legal permissibility of
live-kidney donation from persons with questionable decisionmaking capabilities,16 this Essay defines the issues and invites
debate about whether and under what circumstances adolescents
can consent-or decline-to be living donors and have those
decisions legally protected. This inquiry is compelled because
medical advances must be applied consistently with Gault's rationale that adolescents possess protected liberty interests, which
12. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 623, 634 (1979).
13. Adolescents needing transplant kidneys benefit maximally from those
donated by youths due to compatibility in both tissue-type and fit; without these
living donors, many persons would die or live a decreased quality of life. The
Gift of a Lifetime: The Transplant Waiting List, http://www.organtransplants.
org/understanding/unos (last visited Nov. 20, 2007).
14. See, e.g., Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972)
(affirming right of parents to consent to kidney transplant from one twin to the
other once certain conditions were met). See generally Shartle, supra note 7 (discussing the need for legislation to regulate living organ and tissue donations by
minors).
15.

See Michele Goodwin, My Sister's Keeper?: Children and Compelled Dona-

tion, 29 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 357, 358 (2007).
16. Notable writings on this issue include John A. Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 48

(1976); Cara Cheyette, Note, Organ Harvestsfrom the Legally Incompetent: An Argument Against Compelled Altruism, 41 B.C. L. REv. 465 (2000); Michael T. Morley,
Note, Proxy Consent to Organ Donation by Incompetents, 111 YALE L.J. 1215 (2002);
Sara Lind Nygren, Note, Organ Donation by Incompetent Persons: A Hybrid
Approach, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 471.
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cannot be deprived unless the state as parens patriaeinvokes prior
processes that are fair, impartial, and orderly. As the Court has
recognized, due process is flexible
and calls for such procedural
17
protections as society evolves.
Adolescents have liberty interests in bodily integrity-interests that include freedom from unwanted bodily invasion and
removal of tissue and also in choosing or refusing to undergo a
surgical harvesting of organs for another. Autonomous choice in
accordance with personal intent derived from one's values is a
liberty of action.' Undue constraints on these protected liberty
interests under color of state laws implicate the cardinal principles of Gault.When adolescents' liberty interests trigger due process guaranties, Gault's maxim of participation finds expression
in the process of decision making and the dignity that underlies
it.

More specifically, due process posits whether there is at
stake a protected interest in life, liberty, or property and, if so,
what process must be accorded the person by the state prior to
deprivation of that interest.19 The Supreme Court has analogized
due process to the Magna Carta's "guaranties against the oppressions and usurpations" of the royal prerogative and thus a
restraint on governmental action against an individual.2 °
Although due process evolves and its content is flexible, opportunities to be heard and to participate meaningfully in the decision-making process are essential. 2 '
State omissions rather than actions do not necessarily entail
"deprivations" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.
However, when judges or legislators diminish adolescents' interests qualifying as life, liberty, or property based upon anecdotal
assumptions about their capabilities, there is a state deprivation
17. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) ("'(D]ue process is
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands.'" (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972))); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1967) ("Due process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom.").

18.

Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269, 279 n.7

(1990);Jay Katz, Informed Consent-Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 69, 83 (1993).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XrV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . ").

20.

Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884). Accord McGautha v.

California, 402 U.S. 183, 243 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); In re Gault, 387

U.S. at 62 (Black, J., concurring).
21. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485
(1972) (holding that minimal due process for parole revocation includes both a
preliminary hearing for initial inquiry and later a revocation hearing).
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within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. Due process is an
affirmative command to curb unfairness and oppression, and
therefore state deprivations can be shaped by conceptions of the
primary purposes of the Due Process Clause and by visions of
22
how those purposes should be achieved in relation to minors.
Gault made clear that the Due Process Clause engenders a
proactive interrelationship between minors and the state, in its
role as parens patriae.2' The state falls short of its Gault-assigned
role when it fails to ensure sufficient processes exist to protect
adolescents' liberty interests in various decision-making contexts,
including medical donation. This shortfall results in part from
the state's adherence to factual inaccuracies and potentially fallacious bases for constraining adolescents' liberty rights in specific
contexts without particularized examination. It also results from
the state's failure to establish adequate processes for safeguarding adolescents' liberty interests against unfair encroachment or
usurpation.
This Essay ascertains the precise impact of Gault's due process requirement upon adolescents' living donation and
addresses the state's role in structuring a decision-making process compatible with the unifying principles derived from Gault.
Part II will briefly look at the existing categorical legal rule that
differentiates adolescents from adults and discusses whether that
rule constitutes a distinction without a difference when applied
to medical donation by adolescents. Part II also critiques
reported case law that has authorized parents' decisions about
donation by their children and argues that not only are these
analyses inappropriate as guidance for donation by adolescents
but that they are also inconsistent with the principles of Gault.
These principles and their values will be developed and applied
to adolescents' liberty interests in Part III, and used to inform
state parens patriae action and state law development in Part IV.
II.

A.

A

DISTINCTION WITH-AND WITHOUT-A DIFFERENCE

Adolescents'Developmental Capabilitiesand the Supreme Court

Minors, under law, presumptively lack cognitive capabilities
to exercise decisional rights. 24 The law also presumes parents or
guardians will decide upon medical care for minors in ways that
22. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13, 18-21.
23. Id. at 16-17, 23-27.
24. Rhonda Gay Hartman, Coming of Age: Devising Legislationfor Adolescent
Medical Decision-Making, 28 Am. J.L. & MED. 409, 409-10 (2002).
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promote their best interests. 25 The decisions of parents or guardians concerning minors' medical care are subject only to limited
exceptions affording minors autonomous decision making in
defined areas 26 or when parents' or guardians' decision making
harms minors, thereby constituting grounds for state
intervention.2 7
As a subset of minors, the law distinguishes adolescents'
decisional rights and responsibilities from those of adults. The
Supreme Court has reinforced this conventional distinction for
death penalty eligibility. In Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that
capital punishment for crimes committed by minors violated the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 2 The Court reasoned that
transitory personality traits, susceptibility to negative influences,
and underdeveloped senses of responsibility endemic to adolescence make imposition
of this most severe sanction a dispropor29
tionate punishment.
Yet as the Court observed, this bright-line, eighteen-years-ofage distinction may be one without a difference beyond the capital context.3" The Court recognized that qualities distinguishing
minors from adults "do not disappear when an individual turns
eighteen. By the same token, some under eighteen have already
attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach." 3 ' Adolescents are distinguishable from younger children and, in certain contexts, indistinguishable from adults in terms of requisite
cognitive levels for legal rights and responsibilities.3 2 The
degrees of vulnerability, immaturity, and impetuousness lessen25. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)).
26. See, e.g., In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989) (addressing the mature
minor doctrine); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-106 (2004) (sexual assault);
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-102(c) (3) (West 2006) (sexually transmitted disease); MAss. GEN. LAws, ch. 112, § 12E (2005) (substance abuse); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN, § 333.5127 (West 2001) (HIV); 50 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7201
(West 2006) (voluntary mental health treatment); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-4.6-1
(2001) (routine medical care).
27. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (requiring clear and
convincing evidence of allegations proffered by the State in seeking to sever the
rights of parents in their natural child).
28. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
29. Id. at 569-70.
30. Id. at 574.
31.

Id.

32. See, e.g., Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rappaport, Developmental Trends in
Adolescents' Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 129 (1992); Catherine C. Lewis, A Comparison of Minors'andAdults'
Pregnancy Decisions, 50 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 446 (1980).
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ing cognitive capabilities depend upon particular decision-making contexts.
Roper clearly recognized that, depending on the context, the
legal distinction between adolescents and adults may lack a difference. Less clear is the extent to which adolescents are entitled
to legal deference for decision-making rights in contexts such as
medical donation. The Court in Roper relied on studies suggesting traits that mitigate blameworthiness and culpability and
thus make capital punishment disproportionate for juvenile
crime consistent with decency standards of a civilized society."
However, capabilities to formulate the degree of intent to commit criminal acts justifying the death penalty are distinguishable
from capacities about deliberating and3 deciding
medical or don4
ative matters of importance to youths.
Additionally, accreting scientific investigations about
minors' decision-making capabilities in other contexts such as
custodial interrogation or trial competency demonstrate that
adolescents both differ from younger children in cognitive abilities and depart from conventional suppositions. 31 More significantly, other published studies-specifically those in medical
decision-making contexts-suggest that the very traits sustaining
the Court's analysis in Roper do not inhibit adolescents' cognitive
abilities in quite the same way in non-criminal contexts.3 6 These
studies strengthen the Court's observation that, depending on
the context, differing capabilities between adolescents and adults
are more a matter of degree, not of kind. 7
Adolescents may differ from adults in how they process and
deliberate on information, but these differences may not bear on
actual decisional capabilities for understanding the benefits and
consequences of specific actions. How these cognitive functions
are measured is relevant to assessing whether, in terms of decision making that merits legal protection, the conventional eighteen-year line should be redrawn because it amounts to a legal
33. Roper, 543 U.S. at 563, 578.
34. Id. at 568 (reserving death penalty eligibility for only the worst and
most deserving crimes).
35. See generally YOUTH ON TlAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ONJUVE.
NILEJUSTICE (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000); Thomas Grisso,
Adolescents'Decision Making: A DevelopmentalPerspective on ConstitutionalProvisions
in Delinquency Cases, 32 NEw ENG. J. ON CrM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3 (2006);
Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacitiesto Waive MirandaRights: An EmpiricalAnalysis,
68 CAL. L. REV. 1134 (1981).
36. See, e.g., Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent DecisionalAutonomy for Medical Care: Physician Perceptions and Practices, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 87,
96-121 (2001).
37. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 572-74.
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distinction without an empirical difference. Given that adolescents differ developmentally not just from adults but also from
children, afortiori, those differences deserve particularized legal
policy approaches to adolescents' decisional rights."8
Little guidance for both determining and facilitating adolescents' decision-making capabilities for medical donation is found
in existing law. Reported case law is scant, suggesting minors who
serve as living donors, whether in their own right or by parental
influence, do so in the absence of adequate state supervision.
Moreover, cases involving parents' consent for younger minors to
serve as living donors for siblings are inapposite to adolescents as
potential donors. Courts have simply subsumed parents' decision-making authority about medical donation into existing case
law developed for situations where parents consent to medically
necessary procedures. Here, the procedure is wholly unnecessary
for the donor child.
B.

Case Law ConcerningMinors as Living Donors

Case law related to medical donation by minors largely
involves parents' decisions to compel their children to serve as
living donors for siblings. In contrast to parents seeking medical
care for their children, parental intent in donative circumstances
tends to sacrifice one child's interests for another. However wellintentioned, parents' decisions that one child will serve as a living
organ or skin donor for another child demand close scrutiny.
Parents' decisions in these contexts are replete with biases
out of kinship and desperation and thus can be inimical to the
donor child's interests. While not necessarily malevolent, parents' motivations are influenced by personal priorities, parental
conflicts, and the impact on the entire family, which can cloud
consideration of or even subvert the donor child's interests. That
parents will conceive a child in the hope of an exact match for
the purpose of saving an ill child 9 or will avail themselves of
preimplantation genetic diagnosis of embryos created through in

38. Scientific evidence from the collaboration between neuroscience and
neurobiology should shed new light on understanding brain functioning and
its relationship to decision-making capabilities by providing nuanced insights
about the mind and also new ways of thinking about adult and adolescent cognitive development. SeeJeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand: How Neuroscience Is
Transforming the Legal System, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 11, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 48.
39.

See Gina Kolata, More Babies Being Born to Be Donors of Tissue, N.Y.

TIMES, June 4, 1991, at B1, B6.
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vitro fertilization in an attempt to exact a match vividly illustrates
these points.4"
Precisely because the surgical procedure to which parents
are consenting for the donor child is solely for treating another
child medically,4 1 parental decision making about medical donation is distinguishable from that about necessary medical care.
Consequently, the adequacy of due process to protect and promote donor children's interests takes on greater significance. As
Justice Stevens has observed, "The constitutional protection

against arbitrary state interference with parental rights should
not be extended to prevent the States from protecting children
against the arbitrary exercise of parental authority that is not in
fact motivated by an interest in the welfare of the child."4 2
Indeed not all medical procedures on minors are solely within
parental authority. For example, courts require de novo hearings
and clear and convincing proof, along with a panoply of other
procedural safeguards, prior to authorizing parental consent for
sterilization procedures on minors."
Yet, the concerns distinguishing parental decision making in
terms of therapeutic and non-therapeutic medical procedures
remain relatively unexplored by courts. Somewhat surprising is
the relative ease with which several courts have justified authorizing parents' decisions to use children as donors for the benefit of
other children, largely by reference to medical benefits for the
recipient children and to uncertain psychological benefits that
supposedly overshadow risks to the donor children. By deferring
to parental judgments in ways that obscure careful evaluation of
donor children's interests, 44 courts have tended to eclipse children's liberty interests and thus undermine the fairness and dignity of process for decision making made manifold in Gault when
minors' interests are implicated.4 5
Hart v. Brown46 and In re Sydney Cowan,4 7 though decided
thirty years apart, explicate these points. Both cases involved one
40. See Susan M. Wolf et al., Using PreimplantationGenetic Diagnosisto Create
a Stem Cell Donor: Issues, Guidelines, and Limits, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 327 (2003)
(recommending protections and limits on preimplantation genetic diagnosis to
protect children from exploitation until they are mature enough to decide
donation).
41.
See Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979).
42. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 89 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1944).
43. See, e.g., In reA.W., 637 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1981).
44. Hartman, supra note 24, at 434-46.
45. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18-27 (1967).
46. Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972).
47. In re Sydney Cowan, No. 180564 (Ala. Prob. Ct. 2003).
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identical twin whose parents decided should be a living donor for
her sibling. The state courts ceded to parents' decisions about
compelling seven-year-old Margaret Hart and six-year-old Sydney
Cowan to have their bodies surgically invaded and tissue
extracted to benefit their sisters. Insofar as the best odds of success in transplantation are concerned, identical twins share a
complete genetic identity. But, medical benefits to one child
should not circumvent careful consideration of endangerments
to donor children borne by short- and long-term surgical and
post-surgical risks.4 8 The courts' analyses gave way to a mechanical balancing of interests that subordinated risks to the donor
children in favor of the benefits to the recipient children. Unfortunately, mechanization of a best interests test in this context has
led courts to disregard donor children's liberty interests.
More specifically, the question before the courts should
have been whether the prospective donor children's liberty interests were protected adequately. Instead, the question framed by
the courts was whether parents have the right to consent to surgical operations on both the recipient and donor children. 49 Framing the issue in this way invites balancing tests that generally fail
to consider the donor child's liberty interests and find in favor of
parents' preferences. Such interests balancing by courts not only
fails to satisfy due process for prospective donor children but also
leads to the anomalous result that children have no process for
protection of their liberty interests.
Inasmuch as the courts relied on children's best interests, a
similar argument grounded in due process should be predicated
on a donor child's liberty interests as a basic right to be free from
a surgical invasion of one's body and removal of tissue along with
short- and long-term consequences. Though noting the risk
potential, the courts in neither case delved into the donor children's interests in not having their bodies surgically invaded and
their tissues extracted and in not having the quality and longevity
of their own lives compromised.
Among the issues deserving particularized scrutiny were the
hardships created by the deprivation of their liberty interests. In
addition to serious risks attendant to surgical procedures were
long-term consequences of severe scarring for Sydney Cowan °
and of not having a spare kidney in the event of congenital kid48. See infra notes 141-48 and accompanying text.
49. See Hart, 289 A.2d at 387.
50. For more detailed description and discussion of the consequences to
Sydney Cowan, see Samuel J. Tilden, Ethical and Legal Aspects of Using an Identical
Twin as a Skin TransplantDonorfor a Severely Burned Minor,31 AM. J.L. & MED. 87,
107-12 (2005).
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ney failure for Margaret Hart.5 1 Although physicians who cared
for Katheleen Hart and Jennifer Cowan, the recipient children,
testified about the benefits and risks of the surgeries on the
donor children, the courts overlooked the physicians' biases that
arose out of involvement with the recipient children and that
afforded meager protections to Margaret's and Sydney's distinct
interests. 5 2 Also overlooked was the nature and quality of postsurgery support, including counseling and other emotional support, for the donor children in the event the recipient children
died."3
Moreover, the reliance of courts on supposed psychological
benefits to donor children seems unwarranted. It is one thing to
posit the possibility that donor children may derive such benefits,
but it is quite another to subjugate a child's liberty interests to
unpredictable and speculative benefits. Although both little girls
intimated at wanting to help their sisters, how they were involved
and the extent to which they meaningfully participated in the
donative decision-making processes required independent examinations. These inquiries were crucial for a myriad of reasons, not
the least of which were influences exerted by parents that shaped
their children's responses, convincing the courts that not donating would be deleterious to them.
Furthermore, findings by courts on the aforementioned
points would have provided cues to state legislatures for developing criteria to restrain arbitrary actions and to guide courts in
promoting donor children's interests.5 4 Without legislative guidance or a careful adherence to Gault's mandate, children's protected liberty interests in living donation will likely remain
insufficiently scrutinized by courts.
The absence of legislative guidance notwithstanding, courts
are the ultimate gatekeepers of children's constitutionally protected interests and thus must ensure fair processes regarding
51. See Nygren, supra note 16, at 474 (cautioning against marginalizing
physical risks to donors especially in kidney donation from which the donor is
placed "at a greater risk for kidney complications in the future").
52. See Arthur L. Caplan, Biomedical Technology, Ethics, Public Policy, and the
Law: Am IMy Brother'sKeeper?, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1195, 1199 (1993) ("[Conflicted doctors] cannot both advocate for the best interests of patients who need
transplants and simultaneously protect the best interests of prospective
donors.").
53. In contrast, the Illinois Supreme Court explored available emotional

support for a prospective three-year-old donor child and refused to authorize
parental consent to marrow donation for a twin sister. See Curran v. Bosze,
566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990).
54. See Goodwin, supra note 15, at 372-77 (evaluating whether the tort
doctrine of rescue applies legitimately to children in medical donation cases).

2008]

GAULT'S LEGACY

potential deprivations of those interests. This gate-keeping function requires engaging children about what it means to be a living donor and how they think about it. Their answers provide a
critical canvas on which to evaluate responses about helping
their siblings that, as Hart and Cowan demonstrated, can provide
an evidentiary record for courts to authorize parental consent for
the surgical removal of a kidney for transplant and skin for
graft. 5 In Hart, for example, the court should have scrutinized
the conversations that occurred with Margaret, inquiring into
who initially spoke with her about Katheleen's congenital kidney
failure and also about how Margaret viewed her role in assisting
her sister. These inquiries were relevant in terms of what Margaret actually understood from her own perspective, including
whether she perceived any guilt and concomitant obligation to
comply with donation in order to preserve parental love and care
for her. Indeed, she sensibly may have perceived that she alone
shouldered the burden for easing familial tensions in this
situation.
Closer scrutiny of the conversations with Margaret would
likely reveal subtle, even undue, pressures placed upon her that
subsequently shaped her responses. This suggests that, rather
than rely upon routine appointments of guardians ad litem for
best interests recommendations, courts should also ensure the
donor child's voice is not only represented but also heard meaningfully.5 6 Both direct and representative participation of donor
children seems more compatible with elemental fairness and
accuracy underlying due process.
Another dimension of this case genre is a "substituted judgment" concept. Under that common law doctrine, judges somehow divine the putative wishes of persons regarded as legally
incompetent (i.e., substituting their choices in ways believed to
likely have been those of incompetent persons, if they were competent). No decisive lines of argument or authority exist in donative decision-making contexts,5 7 although a few courts have
55. See Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 389 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972).
56. Cf Lainie Friedman Ross, Moral Groundingfor the Participationof Children as Organ Donors, 21 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 251 (1993) (finding parental consent sufficient regardless of the child's opinion in some contexts); Shartle, supra
note 7, at 465 (proposing that the appointed attorney "must attempt to prevent
the donation" and make the proceedings adversarial).
57. For further discussion of the doctrine's application in living donor

contexts, see Cheyette, supra note 16, at 469 (criticizing the use of substituted
judgment and arguing "organ harvests from children and mentally disabled
adults should be categorically prohibited"); Morley, supra note 16, at 1219
(assailing the position that substituted judgment is misplaced in this realm and

that decisions about compelling donation from one child for another "falls
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relied on its rhetoric when compelling a minor to be a living
donor for another. 58 Little v. Little is instructive. There, the Court
of Civil Appeals in Texas relied on the substituted judgment doctrine to affirm a probate court's authorization of a kidney
removal from Anne Little, a fourteen-year-old with Down's Syndrome, for transplant to her brother.5 9 By substituting its judgment that "Anne desires to donate her kidney to her brother and
would do so if she were competent to make such decision," the
court contrived psychological benefits as promoting her best
interests when it authorized parental consent to the kidney
harvest.6"
Little illustrates that substituted judgment is more problematic than a lip service best interests analysis by stultifying the
donor child's protected interests and by perpetuating result-oriented paths to sanctioning parental requests based on conjectured benefits. As the court in Little conceded, "It is clear in
transplant cases that courts, whether they use the term 'substituted judgment' or not, will consider the benefits to the donor as
a basis for permitting an incompetent to donate an organ. '"61
Using substituted judgment as the basis for authorizing the
use of children as donors is misguided because any predictions
about what donor children would want are indeterminate and
utterly speculative.6 2 Decisively rejecting this standard as altogether inapplicable regarding prospective donor children, the
Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that it is "not possible to discover that which does not exist, specifically, whether the 3 1/2year-old twins would consent or refuse to consent to the prosquarely within the constitutionally protected range of discretion of parentguardians, and may not be reviewed by courts").
58. See, e.g., Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 496-500 (Tex. App. 1979). Cf
Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1323 (Ill. 1990). For thoughtful consideration of Curran,see Janet B. Korins, Curran v. Bosze: Toward a Clear Standardfor
Authorizing Kidney and Bone Marrow Transplants Between Minor Siblings, 16 VT. L.
REV. 499 (1992).
59. Little, 576 S.W.2d at 496-500.
60. Id. at 494, 498-99.
61. Id. at 498.
62. See Morley, supra note 16, at 1235-36 ("The substituted judgment test
is best left to situations where a previously competent person expressed definite
preferences regarding medical treatment, including organ donation, and due
to an accident or some other intervening circumstance, is later unable to effectuate her wishes on her own."); Nygren, supra note 16, at 502 ("Without adequate evidence, the substituted judgment standard will become a forum for the
decision maker to decide whether he, rather than the patient, would be an
organ donor in a similar situation.").
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bone
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Standards of substituted judgment or best interests provide
dubious, if any, assurances that courts scrutinize all relevant factors affecting donor children's interests. Indeed, courts' invocation of these standards seems outcome determinative: they
endorse parents' decisions based on whatever evidence is
presented, in contradistinction to Gault's command to protect
children's liberty interests. In other words, the courts should not
slavishly carry out parents' choices but instead safeguard donor
children's interests.
What emerges from this genre of cases and these lines of
thought is, quite clearly, a lack of coherently elaborated liberty
interests of donor children and processes afforded to them prior
to deprivations of those interests. By emphasizing parents' preferences at the expense-or disregard-of donor children's protected interests, these cases, at worst, create a duplicitous double
standard whereby parents choose to endanger one child to benefit another, with courts legitimizing the choice through contrived
benefits to the donor child. At best, these cases evince the complexities arising from the use of children as living donors and
courts' predilections for sanctifying the preferences of parents
rather than for protecting children's interests in not serving as
donors.
In striking contrast, state courts have rejected as "revolting"
the mere idea of authorizing the forcible extraction of bodily tissue from an adult for another.6 4 To compel one person to submit to a body intrusion for this purpose, according to one court,
"would change every concept and principle upon which our society is founded. To do so would defeat the sanctity of the individual, and would impose a rule which would know no limits, and
one could not imagine where the line would be drawn."6 5
This line-drawing admonition was borne out in Sydney
Cowan's case. There, the court authorized parents' decision making about surgical excision of skin from Sydney for allograft to
Jennifer by relying on previous cases involving the harvest of
internal organs for transplant. 6 In contrast to organ donation,
63. Curran,566 N.E.2d at 1326.
64. McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 91 (C.P. 1978); see also Cheyette,
supra note 16, at 468 (highlighting the troubling paradox when courts "rush to
defend legally competent donors from compelled harvests but defer to thirdparty interests when faced with legally incompetent donors").
65. McFall, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 91-92.
66. In re Sydney Cowan, No. 180564 (Ala. Prob. Ct. 2003). In addition,
line delineations based on biological family relationships have become attenu-
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skin donation entails potentially greater tangible and intangible,
including dignitary, harms to the donor.6 7 By subordinating children's interests to parental preferences and presuming speculative, derivative benefits for children as justification for subjecting
them to organ and tissue removal that is declined by many
rational and intelligent adults, courts diminish the intrinsic
worth and dignity of children in contravention of Gault's
dictates.
Overarching considerations from this genre of cases are
both the extent to which parents are capable of protecting donor
children's interests and the extent to which law may compel children to undergo a risky organ or tissue harvesting solely for the
medical benefit of another child.6 8 A related inquiry concerns
the processes through which the donor child's competing interests are both identified and explored. Young children are not
capable of deciding donation in their own right, and therefore
the propriety and quality of the process for potentially depriving
them of their organs or scarring them permanently takes on even
greater significance under Gault. The central concern of the
Court in Gault was "not with the outcome of the governmental
action, but with the processes through which the action takes
place."6 9 The method of interaction between courts and children
about medical donation must be fair, impartial, and orderly in
terms of expressing a judgment that minors are important in
their own right, and that they must be treated with understanding, compassion, and respect, regardless of whether courts ultimately approve the parents' decisions.
In contrast to donation by a younger child compelled by parents and endorsed by courts, "compelled donation" from adolescents is unthinkable. When the prospective donor is an
adolescent capable of decision making, Gault necessitates an
inquiry into how--not whether-due process should be applied
to decision making about living donation. Precisely because adolescents differ from children in terms of capable decision makated with the expansion of non-nuclear families. These changes raise questions
about line-drawing by judges when compelled donation from a child is
requested by parents for a non-biological sibling (e.g., an adopted or step-sibling) who would benefit regardless of inexact match. See generally Note, Looking
for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the FunctionalApproach to the Legal Definition
of Family, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1640 (1991).
67. See generally Tilden, supra note 50.
68. See Cheyette, supra note 16, at 469 (stating such forcible extraction
disproportionately burdens those who are "wholly unprepared and exposes
them to harms from which they are wholly unprotected").
69. Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to ProceduralProtection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 159 (1978).
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ing, it seems clear that parents or judges cannot compel them to
be living donors. Less clear is the extent to which legal protection should be afforded to their decisions about living donation
(especially when those decisions conflict with parents' preferences), and how states should structure oversight of living donation by adolescents. Implication of adolescents' liberty interests
suggests state parens patriae responsibilities for structuring decision-making processes that measure up to the essentials of due
process. According to Gault, both the appearance and actuality of
fairness, impartiality, and orderliness are important from adolescents' perspectives whenever their liberty interests are implicated.7 ° The task is to ascertain the application of the Due
Process Clause in the context of adolescents' living donation and
in state-structured decisional processes that engender its unifying
principles and underlying values.
III.

DECONSTRUCTING "ESSENTIALS OF DUE PROCESS"

The Due Process Clause requires a two-fold inquiry whenever a person's interest in life, liberty, or property may be
deprived through state action: both the nature of the interest
within the ambit of protection and the state-engineered process
provided that person prior to deprivation of that interest must be
examined.7 1 Due process is a hybrid concept which concerns
both substantive interests accorded constitutional protection and
the state's obligation to afford fair pre-deprivation processes. It is
also influenced importantly by our conceptions of the dignity
and respect that is owed to each individual.7 2
Fair processes for decision making have long been regarded
by the Court as the very essence of justice; this is so because the
"validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely depend on
the mode by which it was reached."7 3 Thus, the decision-making
process is essential to adolescents' substantive liberty interests in
70.
71.
72.

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967).
See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
Sanford Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication: A

Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 347 (1957); see also Duncan v. Louisiana,

391 U.S. 145, 212 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring) ("It is the ...deepening realization of the substance and procedures that justice and the demands of human
dignity require, which has caused this Court to invest the command of 'due
process of law' with increasingly greater substance."); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S.
1, 41 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (highlighting "our beliefs as to due process and the dignity of the individual").
73. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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living donation.7 ' By providing adolescents a chance for participation through which their dignity finds expression, a state-engineered process for decision making about living donation has an
intrinsic value. Regardless of the result, due process represents a
valued human interaction from which adolescents, as affected
from participating in decisions that
persons, perceive self-worth
75
vitally concern them.
Procedural fairness in interactions between minors and the
state is a prerequisite. 76 Although the Gault Court considered
delinquency proceedings entailing commitment to a state institution,7 7 its broader statements about due process as "the primary
and indispensable foundation of individual freedom" transcend
delinquency proceedings to the "totality of the relationship of
the juvenile and the state."'78 Gault's unifying principles-that
states ensure minors' meaningful participation through fair,
impartial, and orderly decision-making processes in matters that
can adversely impact their liberty interests-apply to other settings that implicate liberty interests. The nature of the minors'
interests at stake and the state's role as parens patriae in both protecting and promoting those interests are pivotal to when and to
how these due process essentials apply.
As previously noted, minors' decisions are treated differently
from those of adults by law. 79 This treatment differential is predicated on chronological age and assumptions about diminished
decisional capabilities.8 ' Insofar as adolescents are concerned,
assumptions underlying laws that constrain minors may be
unsubstantiated-indeed inapplicable-to decision making by
adolescents about living donation. Those laws impair rather than
protect adolescents' liberty interests. As studies demonstrate,
adolescents may reason differently than adults but are capable of
comprehending information about available options.8 1
74. See also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (commenting that, if due process protects anything, it protects a person's decision about medical procedures).
75. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 26.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 13, 28, 31-56.
78. Id. at 13, 20; see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675
(1986) (addressing the state's power to prevent lewd speech by students in public schools); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (addressing the state's power
for admitting children to mental care facilities).
79. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
80. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 602 (2005); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 623, 633 (1978); see also supra Part II.A.
81. See Hartman, supra note 36, at 123-28.
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Central to the due process notion of dignity is the truth or
accuracy of the data upon which governments' actions are premised. Accuracy depends not on anecdotal assertions but on reliable determinations. Gault premised fairness on government
actions that demonstrate individuated treatment of minors; as a
subset of minors, adolescents' cognitive capacities and decisionmaking abilities must not be based on conventional notions,
especially notions about younger children's abilities. States'
parens patriaeauthority therefore must afford adolescents not just
a voice but also some decision in living donation so that their
participation is meaningful and not merely symbolic. In this
regard, Gault applies and adapts to decision-making processes
involving adolescents' protected liberty interests under the Due
Process Clause.
A.

Liberty Interests in Living Donation

The Court has long acknowledged that liberty interests
82
evolve and are shaped by society's experiences and conscience.
Liberty is a broad but bounded concept traced to freedom from
personal restraints.8 3 Bodily integrity is primary to any freedom
from government-engineered constraints on our physical persons and on our decision making about ourselves. Bodily integrity, although indeterminate, is a constitutionally protected
interest. According to Cruzan, this interest is central to decision
making about medical procedures and thus "is more properly
8 4
analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest.
Although the Court has not squarely addressed the contours
of bodily integrity in living donation, these interests sensibly comprise a sphere of protected liberty. In reaffirming the "substantive force of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause" in
matters of bodily integrity, the Court has explained:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person can make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of exis82. See City of Cleburne v.Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985)
("History makes clear that constitutional principles of equality, like constitutional principles of liberty, property, and due process, evolve over time.").
83. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Of Liberty and Property, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
405, 409-14 (1977).
84. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 n.7 (1990); see
also Monaghan, supra note 83, at 409-10.
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tence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life.85
For adolescents who may serve as prospective living donors,
moreover, Gault's mandate that due process is not exclusively for
adults directs that both the substantive and procedural aspects of
the government's relationship with adolescents be defined in this
86
context.
The freedom for determining boundaries of bodily integrity
and the dignity that is derived from decision making about one's
body, whether adult or adolescent, involve liberty interests that
trigger procedural safeguards.8 7 Minimally, this includes the due
process essentials of fairness, impartiality, and orderliness
required by the Court in Gault whenever minors' liberty interests
are implicated. 8 By explicitly including minors in due process's
protections, the Court implied that adolescents, like adults, must

experience an ethic of mutual respect and self-esteem-in a
word, dignity.8 " One could even say that dignity is the most fundamental of all values anchored in the liberty protections of the
Due Process Clause.9 0
B.

Dignity's Centrality to Liberty Interests

Courts historically have recognized dignity's salience to liberty interests and to the meaning found in decision making
about significant personal matters.9" Decision-making processes
are tightly connected to a dignity norm underlying due process.
Underscoring the personal meaning found in participating in
decision-making processes is the state's commitment "to foster
' 2
the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders."
Liberty interests embrace dignitary values of self-identity and
individualism, and thus due process of law must be defined in
terms of its impact upon the dignity of those persons whom it
affects. An ethic of reverence underlies the idea of dignity
because our capacities for reasoning afford moral development
85. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
86. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
87. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269 n.7; see also id. at 289 (O'Connor, J.,

concurring).
88.

In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 26; see also infra Part III.C.1.
RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 256 (1971).
90. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 233 (1976) (StevensJ, dissenting);
see also Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 24 n.5 (1998) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
91. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 632 (1896).
92. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970).

89.
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through which relationships with others, our environments, and
especially ourselves are understood. 9 Even at very young ages,
children develop levels of moral reasoning, including understandings of right and wrong concerning themselves and
others.94
As a value underlying due process, dignity is reflected
through fair, impartial, and orderly processes, 9 5 which is why it is
not only central to constitutional interpretation as in Gault but
also to medical consent.9 6 Adolescents realize personal dignity in
large measure by participating in decision-making processes that
impact matters of importance to them and in having their participation regarded and respected by others who talk with rather
than to them.9 7 An inability to express their voices and views
about significant personal matters or a perception of unjust deprivations of their interests demoralizes adolescents. The demoralizing effects from withered self-concepts and damaged identities
can harm adolescents in the long-term. Deprivations of dignity
are not inconsequential for anyone, let alone adolescents who
seem more sensitized to perceiving affronts to their abilities and
hence to their worth.
Particularly for adolescents, a sense of dignity springs not
necessarily from the outcomes of government determinations
but from the interactions between them and the government
that occur through decision-making processes. In Gault, the
Court underscored that both the appearance and the actuality of
fairness, impartiality, and orderliness are impressive to minors.98
Even when outcomes are viewed as unjust, the results may be
accepted as legitimate if the decision-making processes reflect
dignitary values of individualism, self-identity, and self-respect.
This was the thrust of Gault wherein the Court directed that stateengineered decision-making processes regarding minors must
comport with "essentials of due process and fair treatment."9 9
93.

RAwLs, supra note 89, at 22-25, 251-57.

94.

See generally ROBERT

95.
96.

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967).
See Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899,

COLES, MORAL INTELLIGENCE OF CHILDREN

(1997).

900-01 (1994).
97. According to John Rawls,
Self-respect is not so much a part of any rational plan of life as the
sense that one's plan is worth carrying out. Now our self-respect normally depends on the respect of others. Unless we feel that our
endeavors are honored by them, it is difficult if not impossible for us
to maintain the conviction that our ends are worth advancing.
RAwLs, supra note 89, at 178.
98. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 26.
99.

Id. at 30.
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State Action, Parens Patriae, and Process

Regarding due process as indispensable to the social compact defining individual rights and delimiting states' powers,' 0 0
the Court emphasized the special impact that due process has for
minors, for whom "the appearance as well as the actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness-in short, the essentials of due
process-may be a more impressive and more therapeutic attitude . . . ."' This raises several complex questions. Chief among
them are those of interpretation and application. What is meant
by fairness in decision making about living donation? By impartiality? Orderliness? How should due process essentials be thought
about in terms of the state's relationship with adolescents in various contexts, including living donation?
1.

Fairness, Impartiality, and Orderliness

Fairness is a defining aspect of due process. Yet the Court's
references to fairness have been rather oblique and less than specific in defining both its scope and composition as a constitutional value. Indeed, the Court's mandate of fairness in Gault was
more conclusive than explanative, leaving open how fairness
should be defined when a minor's liberty interests are implicated. Minimally, fairness reflects an even-handed rather than
capricious characteristic of government conduct and safeguards
against discriminatory or patently arbitrary actions. Put another
way, fair processes constitute buffers against arbitrary abrogation
of constitutionally protected interests. 10 2 Thus, government
processes for living donation decision making by adolescents
must reflect not pretense but particularized consideration of
their decision-making abilities. 103 Objective, scientific data rather
than sweeping assertions grounded in conventional suppositions
about youth should inform legislative treatment of adolescents.
Inaccurate information on which legislative action is based yields
"mistaken assumptions, which in turn produce substantially
10 4
unfair results."
A corollary to fair, factually-based processes is the appearance
of fairness from adolescents' perceptions that repose trust in the
decision-making process and generate a sense of being treated
justly. This perception-of-fairness value enhances a personal
100.
101.
102.
103.
tension in
104.

Id. at 20.
Id. at 26.

Id. at 19-21.
See id. at 24 (expressing concern about the State's reliance on prerelation to facts in its treatment of minors).
Saphire, supra note 69, at 166.
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sense of dignity and the unquantifiable human interest in receiving regular and respectful treatment from the state. Conversely,
donative decision-making processes perceived by adolescents as
being partial or even prejudiced not only undermine the appearance of just treatment but can also have longer-term, damaging
effects on adolescents. 10 5
Indeed, for processes to be fair they must be impartial-that
is, predispositions must not be inherent to the process. Any
notion of impartiality concerning adolescents in decision making
about living donation entails equal and nonbiased approaches,
both actual and perceived. 10 6 There is little question that someone uninvolved in the care of the potential recipients should
conduct this decision-making process.107
Neutrality in this decisional process suggests that those who
discuss living donation with adolescents should not only have no
actual bias but should also appear to be independent and
nonbiased. Ostensible partiality of physicians involved in the care
of transplant recipients circumvents due process values. This is so
because there is an inherent conflict of interest, both in advocating for their transplant patients' interests and in protecting prospective donors' interests. Physicians of would-be recipients "may
be so eager to proceed that their enthusiasm may color the
extent or kind of information made available to prospective
donors.""0 ' Physicians might create biasing influences on adolescents through their attitudes and approaches to donative conversations that directly or indirectly inhibit adolescents' unfettered
participation. Underscoring this point is the reality that adolescents may already be disadvantaged in donative decision making
relating to family members due to requests and expectations.
Both participation and accuracy are inextricably intertwined
with fairness through consistent, cohesive state-structured
approaches to adolescents' participation in decisions affecting
their lives. Participation in the decision-making process is a sine
qua non of procedural due process and was central to the Court
in Gault. A frank and forthright interchange through dialogue
about living donation in a conversational setting underscores the
intrinsic purpose of due process by giving more than symbolic
content to adolescents' participation and to the processes for
interaction that are important in their own right.
105. See RAWLS, supra note 89, at 28-31.
106. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 26.
107. See Authors for the Live Organ Donor Consensus Group, Consensus
Statement on the Live Organ Donor,284J. Am. MED. ASS'N 2919 (2000), available at
http://www.kidney.org/transplantation/livingdonors/pdf/ama-article.pdf.
108. Caplan, supra note 52, at 1199-1200.
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Aside from psychological benefits adolescents derive from
participating in conversations about living donation is the value
of a process that ensures adolescents' opportunities to be heard
about matters profoundly affecting them. This dialogue about
the various consequences of living donation is requisite to adolescents' liberty interests, to society, and to our constitutional
framework. Few choices are more private and intimate than
those concerning the use of one's own body.' °9 Thus, adolescents' necessary participation in meaningful dialogue and decision making about living donation is manifest. Participation is a
component of processes that are, in fact, meaningful to the donation decision. Participation also addresses a broader concern for
reaching an accurate decision about living donation-one that
truly reflects an adolescent's personal values and desires.
Orderliness in the state's fair and impartial treatment of
minors is also essential to providing rudimentary due process
and preventing incursions on minors' protected interests under
Gault. Implicit to orderly government processes are official
actions that administer reliable patterns in approaches to adolescents' interests. Such patterns result in regularities that not only
instill confidence regarding fairness and impartiality but also
inspire respect for them. Timeliness in official actions matters;
preventing undue incursions by state actions on adolescents' liberty interests in medical donation necessitates that due process
precede any potential deprivation.
Time sequence is indeed critical to living donation decisionmaking processes, raising a question as to whether collateral
legal remedies could ever be adequate for persons who have suffered deprivation of their protected interests. Children who had
been used as donors might, upon reaching adulthood, pursue
avenues for post-deprivation remedies. Beyond liberty interests in
being free from bodily invasion and consequent physical, psychological, and dignitary harms are rights not to have the government authorize the taking of one's property for another's use
without just compensation. It is neither far-fetched nor fanciful
to think that judicial authorization for the harvest of organs or
tissues from minors arguably runs afoul of the Takings Clause. 110
If human tissues constitute forms of property, as some courts
have found,11 then taking kidneys or skin from minors for
109. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
110. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
111. See, e.g., Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App.
1993) (gametes); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Ct.
App. 1988) (cells); Massey v. Duke Univ., 503 S.E.2d 155 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998)
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others arguably impairs both proprietary and privacy interests
protected by the Takings Clause, especially when state action
exacts their surrender. 1 2 As such, the Takings Clause could
operate to curb both exploitation
and expropriation of minors
113
for living donor purposes.
Moreover, post-deprivation remedies by way of tort suits may
be available to minors upon reaching majority for injuries including subsequent health problems." 4 Damage claims could plausibly be based on tort theories of conversion (i.e., nonconsensual
taking of their property interests in their organs or tissues for
another's use), should a court find a property interest as a condition precedent to recovery. Another theory on which recovery
could be based is battery (i.e., harmful or offensive touching
through surgical harvest of one's organs or tissue without one's
consent), if a minor is denied the opportunity to be heard meaningfully about not serving as a living donor before the time of
harvest. 15
Regardless of any avenues available under state law, afterthe-fact redress through post-deprivation proceedings is unsuitable as "unfortunate prescriptions of remedy" under Gault." 6
Timing matters in terms of the harms incurred by non-regenerative organ and tissue removal. That children upon becoming
adults will not be able to fully recover their interests through
(deceased body); Emeagwali v. Brooklyn Hosp. Ctr., 815 N.Y.S.2d 494 (Sup. Ct.
2006) (fetal tissue). These courts, however, have carefully avoided setting unsavory precedent that human tissues constitute commodities.
112. Refusing to authorize surgical harvest of a kidney from one minor
for an adult sibling, a state appellate court rejected the notion that minors'
property interests are less important than their liberty interests. Finding in the
law an unqualified protection comparatively for property interests, the court
stated that it is inconceivable that less protection should be afforded "to a
minor's right to be free in his person from bodily intrusion to the extent of loss
of an organ." In re Richardson, 284 So.2d 185, 187 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
113. For thoughtful development of the Takings Clause in the context of
organ donation for transplantation, see Erik S. Jaffe, Note, "She's Got Bette
Davis['s] Eyes": Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver Organs Under the
Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 528 (1990).
114. See Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2000) (involving claims
based on state law and federal civil rights statutes against parents, physicians,
and hospital by a woman who underwent a nonconsensual tubal ligation at age
sixteen); Dina Mishra, Comment, 'Tis Better to Receive: The Case for an Organ
Donee's Cause of Action, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 403 (2007) (discussing the growing importance of donees' causes of action, given trends in living organ
donation).
115. See Caplan, supra note 52, at 1198 (observing that, without consent,
"the use of living persons would be taking not giving, battery rather than
altruism").
116. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20 (1967).
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post-deprivation litigation is inescapable. Given the nature of the
interests at stake, the decision-making process, including use of
accurate and adequate procedural protections, must
l1 7 precede
rather than follow any deprivation of those interests.
The absence of regular, regulated processes involving
minors "has not always produced fair, efficient, and effective procedures" and heightens the possibility that minors will be treated
unfairly and arbitrarily in contravention of Gault.1 18 The question is not whether due process applies to adolescents' decision
making about medical donation, but how the state should structure a process that ensures meaningful participation and decision making. Put another way, how the essentials for due process
and fair treatment are effectuated for medical donation depends
on the state's evolving parens patriae role regarding adolescents.
2.

Role of Parens Patriae

Parens patriae refers to the state's role as sovereign and
guardian of minors' interests; it is a concept of standing that is
utilized to protect those interests.1 1 9 According to Gault, a stagnant view of this Latin phrase makes the meaning murky and its
relevance dubious; 120 rather, parens patriae is inherently elastic
and evolving to protect minors' interests and promote their welfare. If, as the Court emphasized in Gault, the state retains moral
responsibilities to promote fair and benevolent treatment of
minors, then state parens patriaeprocesses that facilitate minors'
decision making and ensure their participation in the decisional
process achieve those aims.
As the Court in Gault also emphasized, the state as parens
patriae has an overriding moral responsibility to include adolescents' meaningful participation in decision making that implicates due process interests.1 2 1 Moral legitimacy of adolescents'
medical donation is sensibly borne by the process by which that
decision is made. Their active participation in any decisional process suggests a dialogue as an expression of their dignity. The
importance of being heard, essential to due process, resonates in
117. See Saphire, supra note 69, at 161 (emphasizing "the fundamental
role of prior dialogue in the fairness and legitimacy of deprivation decisions"
compared with post-deprivation participation that would reduce individual consultation to "a mere afterthought").

118.

In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 18-19.

119.
120.
121.

BLACK's LAw DICrIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 16.
Id. at 16-19.
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especially beneficial
ways with adolescents as they prepare to
22
become adults. 1

3.

Facilitating a Process for Informed Decision Making

If, as Gault held, states in their parens patriae roles are morally responsible for facilitating minors' participation in decision
making, then statutory schemes must ensure minors receive careful, compassionate, and individualized treatment about living
donation. The quality of adolescents' participation and degree of
autonomous decision making about either choosing or declining
to donate freely, voluntarily, and meaningfully are central to a
constitutionally adequate state process. As with any informed
consent process, participation implicates the norm of respect for
persons. 123 Indeed, dignity embodied by the due process maxim
of participation finds expression through a decision-making
pro124
cess and a corollary respect for the choices made.
An informed decision-making process facilitates meaningful
engagement that promotes dignity for the prospective donors
and their choices. 12 5 While not necessarily instilling in persons a
philosophy of giving, it affords them an opportunity to develop
such a philosophy. Moreover, participatory processes that give
meaning to due process values provide a shield against pressures
brought to bear on any potential donor, let alone an adolescent
who may be capable though impressionable. Adolescents may
perceive an obligation to donate to a relative as a way of defining
the relationship. 1 26 Conversely, adolescents may want to be a living donor for a non-family member or may want to decline to
donate to a sibling despite respective parental oppositions or
preferences. Human relationships are complex by nature, and
the microcosm of living donation heightens these complexities.
The complicated range of family relationships can create subtle
but real pressures on potential donors. Inasmuch as interfamilial
influences impact prospective donors, their emotional relationships with the recipients can "call into question their ability to
provide consent." 127
More specifically, the languishing of someone awaiting a lifesaving organ coupled with coercive pressures exerted by interested parties can cause a prospective donor to experience guilt,
122. See id. at 26.
123. Katz, supra note 18, at 83-86.
124. See Schuck, supra note 96, at 900-01 (recognizing the fundamental
role of informed consent in the Supreme Court's conception of autonomy).
125. See id. at 933-34.
126. Caplan, supra note 52, at 1205.
127. Id. at 1206.
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blameworthiness, or a general sense of letting others down that
impinge, if not nullify, free and voluntary consent.1 28 Different
degrees and types of coercion impact adolescents who are, in
many respects, still dependent on family. They may perceive no
option other than to donate (essentially no choice at all). Even
for non-relatives, such as friends or classmates, adolescents may
perceive no other option than to indicate a willingness to be living donors of organs or tissues-especially when the ability to
find other possible donors is limited by time or other factors.
Thus, states should structure formalized, prophylactic protections for adolescents that include standardized approaches to
decision-making processes to explore their personal concerns
and facilitate their choice about whether or not to be a living
donor. 129

Through state-designed processes that recognize their decision making about medical donation, adolescents perceive an
importance in their own right and a respect for their choices. As
the Court in Gault suggested when it underscored the propriety
of the decision-making process, adolescents derive benefit from
the process of decision making that responds to basic values of
self-respect and autonomy, separate and apart from the ultimate
choice about donation. I3 ° A decision-making process that fosters
adolescents' development is closely connected to the dignity
value underlying due process, reflecting an ethic of reverence for
human beings and their personal decisions that express individuality and self-identity. Adolescents ascribe value to engaging with
others about matters affecting their lives that enhance their
developing self-image and self-identity. Engaging in decision
making about living donation would also enrich adolescents by
heightening consciousness about service to others and by imbibing moral values about selfless acts that transcend into other
areas of their lives.
128. See Denise Grady, Transplant Frontiers: Healthy Give Organs to Dying,
Raising Issue of Risk and Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2001, at Al ("[A] relative's
fatal illness itself can be coercive, evoking a powerful sense of obligation and
the feeling that to say no is to let the patient die without trying to help.").
129. The seriousness of donative decisions require processes through
which prospective donors are able to "look within and confront their fears, values, and feelings" about themselves in relation to others. Id.; see alsoJoel D.
Kallich & Jon F. Merz, The Transplant Imperative: ProtectingLiving Donorsfrom the
Pressureto Donate, 20J. CoRp. L. 139, 153 (1995) ("A need exists for the development of a standard presentation of the risks and benefits of living donation that
is not vague, but is understandable to a lay audience."); Shartle, supra note 7, at
435 ("[L]egislation ... is desperately needed to protect the physiological and
psychological health of minors.").
130. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967).
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The very nature of living "donation" involves an act of giving
a gift to another. For living donors, it is a profound personal gift
of the body. Donations are driven by motives and desires shaped
by personal values. Some decisions about donation are based on
perceived advantage or disadvantage to oneself. Other decisions
may derive from an unselfish regard for the welfare of another
person, as when an adolescent, without being asked, wants to
donate to a friend or classmate who may die if he does not
receive a kidney; the benefit derived is the benefit to the person
receiving the kidney. This is altruism, although the concept is not
a simple one. Quite to the contrary, its complexity warrants scrutiny in terms of its meaning in specific contexts. For example,
altruism is not present with young children whom parents compel to serve as donors for siblings. Unlike a child, an adolescent is
capable of acting on altruistic desires by agreeing to a surgical
harvest of her kidney for transplant in her sibling. Yet these altruistic motives seem purer when an adolescent desires to be a living
donor for someone, such as a classmate, who is not connected to
her family unit.1 3 '
Thus, among the benefits adolescents may derive from participating in decision making about living donation is an appreciation of altruism. Altruism engenders self-sacrifice and an
unselfish devotion to others' welfare. As such, it is revered in any
civilized society because it finds expression through social interactions that reflect mutual respect and dignity.' 3 2 The act of
donating human tissues suggests the value of altruism.' 3 3 Yet,
altruism in the context of tissue donations merits closer examination in terms of its meaning and limitations. For example, living
donation can entail a form of self-interest in which the donor
derives a benefit (e.g., reputation enhancement, good feelings
about oneself, or defining a relationship with the recipient) from
the act of donation.
Altruism in a pure sense portends a selflessness in which an
altruist derives no self-benefit from donation;' 3 4 otherwise, the
131. Joseph P. DeMarco, In Defense of Kidney Donation, 4 Am. J. BIOETHICS
33, 34 (2004) ("The fact that people do make autonomous choices about living
donation adds to the morally commendable nature of the act.").
132. See RAWLS, supra note 89, at 251-57.
133. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL Givr ACT (amended 2006), 8A U.L.A. 17
(Supp. 2007). But see Christopher Robertson, Framing the Organ System: Altruism
and Cooperation, 4 Am. J. BIOETHICS 46, 46 (2004) ("There is some question of
whether altruism was ever the right way to think about cadaveric organ donation, since the typical donor is not sacrificing anything (as he or she is already
dead and the organs will rot otherwise).").
134. Philanthropic giving without tangible self-benefit suggests one such
example of altruism in a pure sense. See Jim Holt, Good Instincts: Why Is Anyone
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selflessness of the act is marginalized. Altruism also implies a personal awareness and decision about offering one's self for
another's benefit, rather than being compelled to give of one's
self to another. " 5 Normative judgments about altruism toward
others give meaning to donative decision making, no less for adolescents than for adults in identical situations. Decision-making
processes about living donation provide opportunities to adolescents for learning about self-sacrifice, for reaching for something
that had seemed beyond them, and for gaining deep understanding about themselves in relation to altruistic acts and others'
needs. Society, therefore, has an interest in cultivating altruism
in adolescents as they develop into adults, which suggests that
decision-making schemes about living donation further the
state's parens patriae role in "the totality" of its relationship with
adolescents. 136
Processes designed to facilitate adolescents' decision making
for medical donation also further the norms of autonomy (selfdetermination), beneficence (health and well-being promotion),
and nonmaleficence (harm prevention) underlying bioethical
policy.1 37 The doctrine of informed consent, which is the primary legal implementation of bioethical norms, envisages a process through which physicians disclose relevant information to
patients in ways they can comprehend and understand, and in
settings conducive to deliberation about available1 3 treatment
8
options so that choices reflect their views and values.
An Altruzst?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2008, § 6 (Magazine), at 11. Volunteering for
public service is another. See, e.g., ROBERT COLES, THE CALL OF SERVICE (1993)
(exploring voluntary public service and the rationales, impulses, and values
which inspire it).
135. See Sheldon Zink & Stacey L. Wertlieb, Forced Altruism Is Not Altruism,
4 AM. J. BIOETHICS 29, 30 (2004) ("If [the] sense of altruism was to be replaced
with the knowledge that donors were not saving a person in need but acting on
[self-interest] it would fundamentally change the donor-recipient interaction."); see also Robertson, supra note 133, at 48 (describing altruism as "a matter of supererogation, not duty").
136. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
137. The ancient principle of primum non nocere ("above all, do no harm")
is germane to living donation because doctors are performing surgeries on persons who do not need them and that are to benefit others. Although the donorpatient may derive benefits through spiritual and moral goods from undergoing surgeries for donative purposes that seem consistent with beneficence as
the primary norm of biomedical ethics, the meaning and scope of "do no
harm" in this context deserves continued discourse. See President's Council on
Bioethics, Transcript of Session 2: Living Organ Donation: Outcomes and Ethics (Sept. 7, 2006), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/transcripts/sept06/
session2.html.
138. Katz, supra note 18, at 86-87; Schuck, supra note 96, at 932-34.
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Although the quality of the conversation depends in part on
the physician and/or the healthcare institutions, state laws that
mandate informed consent processes increase the probability
that a conversation will at least take place."3 9 In living donation
contexts, states should devise decision-making processes with
potential donors, especially adolescents, that are conducted by
persons other than the physicians caring for recipient patients
since those physicians' approaches to the conversation are laden
with professional and institutional biases. 4 ' In addition to guiding transplant facilities in determining how decision-making
processes involving youths as living donors should unfold, statutory schemes should set forth criteria for informing and deepening adolescents' understanding about living donation, including
all tangible and intangible risks of harm.
While quality-of-life surveys and longitudinal studies on children and adolescents who had been living kidney donors would
be valuable for improved risk-benefit analysis, 4 ' the known risks
incurred by donors are not insignificant' 4 2 and include exposure
to morbidity and mortality. 4' 3 Formal tracking of the longer-term
health and well-being of living donors is virtually nonexistent. 144
The lack of centralized data and precise statistics suggest that living donation is still "a vast scientific and social experiment."1 4' 5
Data on surgical harvests indicate live donation of liver and lung
tissue is riskier than live donation of kidneys. Even so, 1youths
"are
46
being asked to act as liver donors for their parents."'
Despite risks, successful renal transplants can provide
donors with the sense that the undertaking "was fruitful and
worthwhile."' 4 7 But, emotional ramifications that result from living donation seem reasonably related both to the donor's ongo139. See, e.g., 40 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1301.811-A (West 1999).
140. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
141. See generally ORGAN DONATION, supra note 11.
142. According to one transplant director, the complication rate for living donors is thirty-five to forty percent; ten to fifteen percent of all donors
have major complications, and a few have died. Laura Meckler, What Living
Donors Need to Know: Even as TransplantsSurge, Data on Long-Term Impact on Givers
Remain Scant, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2007, at B11.
143. See id. (quoting a transplant center director who assessed surgical
harvest for donation as "a big, big-deal type of surgery"); see also Denise Grady,
Death of Donor Halts Some Transplants, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at A15; Denise
Grady, Lzver Donors Face Perils Known and Unknown, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2002, at
Fl.
144. See ORGAN DONATION, supra note 11, at 9 (recommending central
registries for tracking purposes).
145. Grady, supra note 128, at A12.
146. Id.
147. Montgomery et al., supra note 11, at 419.
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ing personal condition and to the recipient's condition,
1 48
especially if the donated kidney fails and the recipient dies.
Along with any onset of physical and/or psychological problems
are economic burdens borne by donors that can cause distress
and disruption. While expenses incurred during the donative
process may be covered through reimbursements,1 49 subsequent
health problems stemming from the donation usually are not.'5 °
State legislative provinces are most appropriate for determining the content and criteria for adolescents' decision-making
processes about living donation. These determinations should
include the procedure, parties, and content of donative discussions. As previously discussed, the decision-making process has
intrinsic value because it grants adolescents' a chance for meaningful engagement and an opportunity to express their dignity as
persons. Consequently, adolescents who decide to donate to family members should do so free from pressures, either external or
internal.
If a process for decision making is to have maximal meaning, adolescents must also be able to decline to donate. So, too,
adolescents may decide to donate to non-family members such as
friends or classmates. Decisions about serving as living donors for
non-related persons should likewise be respected and considered
if acts of altruism and self-giving are to mean anything to adolescents. There are, of course, fault lines in this approach, not the
least of which are parental concerns about the donation which
should be brought to bear on adolescents' decision making. It is
plausible that, given the risks mentioned above, parents may
resist adolescents' donative desires; however, it seems equally
plausible that parents would support adolescents' altruistic
desires to aid another who is in need.
Taken together, the due process essentials elucidated by the
Court in Gault for affording fair treatment to minors in matters
affecting their lives suggest a set of values that promote the per148. Grady, supra note 128, at A12 (reporting the impact on a living
donor when the recipient died, noting that a young relative who donated
"became depressed, not only because of the death, but because she herself had
gone through a painful operation and felt disfigured by the big abdominal scar
it had left, while nothing had been gained").
149. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 15/12-20 (2002) (providing reimbursement
for actual expenses incurred).
150. Additionally, some states provide tax deductions for living donation.

See, e.g.,

IOWA CODE ANN.

§ 427.7 (West 2006);

MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 290.01 (West

2007); N.Y. 60-22 § 612 (McKinney 2005). Most adolescents do not file tax
returns, however, and those who do probably do not itemize for the benefit of
such deduction. Thus, the costs of future health complication as a result of
donation likely exceed any form of tax benefit.
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sonal dignity of adolescents and the emerging adults within
them. Precisely because the Court has recognized minors' constitutionally protected liberty interests and their meaningful participation about deprivations of those interests, states should devise
statutory schemes for donative decision-making processes by adolescents that reflect Gault's mandate of providing them with due
process and fair treatment.
IV.

STATE ACTION ENGENDERING GAULT'S PRINCIPLES FOR

ADOLESCENTS' DECISIONAL INTERESTS

Since Gault, the Supreme Court has reiterated that constitu-

tional protections extend to minors' without further particularizing the required procedural safeguards for juvenile
proceedings152 -or for any other specific context.15 Other than
rendering opinions replete with the "essentials of due process
and fair treatment" catchphrase, state courts have likewise not
explicated Gault's due process requirements. Indeed, neither
state courts nor legislatures have paid sufficient attention to the
primacy of minors' protected interests and to the due process

infrastructure envisioned by Gault.
By legally categorizing adolescents as children and curtailing
their liberty in personal decision making (based on questionable
suppositions about vulnerabilities and immaturities), state action
raises Gault's critical concern as to whether "fact and pretension"

once again coincide in the treatment of minors. 54 The need for
fair procedures is heightened when inaccurate factual bases

likely lead to erroneous assumptions and unfair results. 5 ' Stated
differently, the state as parens patriae must structure fair, impartial, and orderly decision-making processes whenever minors'
constitutionally protected interests are at stake. Rather than
endorsing a static concept of due process, Gault stands for a concept of due process that is open to state courts' and legislatures'
elaboration, so as to reflect evolving views about what the essen151. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S.Ct. 2618 (2007); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822 (2002); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
152. See Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 39,
46 (2003) (criticizing the Court's "adult rights or no rights approach" that has
"produced a hodgepodge of procedures" ill suited to children).
153. See Rhonda Gay Hartman, AIDS and Adolescents, 7J. HEALTH CARE L.
& POL'Y 280 (2004) (discussing the lack of procedural safeguards afforded adolescents in the specific context of HIV testing and treatment).
154. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 & n.30 (1967).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 102-04.
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tials of due process should be in any given context for
adolescents.
A.

State Case Law

Although the Supreme Court itself has not particularized
due process essentials for minors' liberty rights since Gault,15 6
state courts have done even less. Other than quoting extensively
"essentials of due process and fair treatment" to which delinquency proceedings must measure, 157 state courts have turned
the Court's mandate of due process into mere legal vernacular
rather than into processes that adequately protect minors' liberty
rights.
A related concern is the cascading effect of state courts' due
process recitations that lack principled content and bypass
opportunities to translate Gault's principles into various contexts
implicating minors' liberty interests. State courts' development
of minors' liberty interests could provide useful information to
lawmakers for developing policy and legislation to guide the judiciary. Moreover, state court judges, along with counsel representing youths, could-and should-be more active under state
constitutions' parallel due process provisions that offer even
greater protections for minors' liberty interests than those recognized by the Supreme Court.1 58 A cascade of case law attentive to
adolescents' liberty interests could be generated because "when a
state court is deciding about the meaning of its own due process
clause it might well consult the decisions of other state courts,"
59
especially those with similar state constitutional provisions.'
States commonly consult the practices of other states in this
regard, meriting a conclusion that "'comparative law' is a routine
and uncontroversial feature of the jurisprudence of state
courts."' 6 0
That state courts have not heretofore elaborated on Gault's
principles in contexts implicating adolescents' liberty interests
156.

See generally Buss, supra note 152.

In re Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. JV157. See, e.g.,
508488, 915 P.2d 1250, 1255 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); In re Shannon B., 27 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 800, 807 (Ct. App. 1994); In re Darnel S., 760 A.2d 1023, 1026 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2000); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't of Coos County v. Welch, 501 P.2d
991, 994 (Or. Ct. App. 1972); In re Farms, 268 A.2d 170, 175 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1970); In re CT, 140 P.3d 643, 646 (Wyo. 2006).
158. See generally Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions:
The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1131 (1999).

159. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 131, 142 (2006).
160. Id. at 135.
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highlights the importance of legislative action to carry out the
parens patriaeresponsibility Gault envisioned. Because legislation
generally sweeps more broadly than court rulings, maximal
opportunities are presented for carefully considering the wide
range of issues related to living donation-particularly to adolescents' liberty interests in medical donation. Comprehensive
schemes for decision making are currently lacking and, for adolescents, state parens patriaeprotection of their decisional liberty
interests is an unfulfilled promise.
B.

State Statutory Law

Following passage of the National Organ Transplant Act,' 61
all states adopted a version of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act,
which governs organ and tissue donation.1 6 2 Although federal
and state laws permit compensation for transplant services but
proscribe payment for or brokerage of organs, governance has
not kept pace with transplant advances 163 and the exponential
increase of living donation. In response, Congress enacted the
Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act to sustain a policy of organ procurement through altruistic acts and to
encourage living donation by providing reimbursements for
expenses.16 4 Adolescents as a donor group are absent from this
government oversight. This signals the need for a comprehensive
scheme for decision making that includes adolescents as living
donors. Such a scheme may be properly achieved through statutory enactment, possibly in combination with central registries
165
and pilot programs focused on youths as living donors.
A few states regulate the donation of regenerative tissues
such as blood or bone marrow by minors,1 6 6 but living donation
161. National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339,
2342-45 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274 (2000)).
162. UNIF. ANATOMICAL Giwr Acr (amended 2006), 8A U.L.A. 17 (Supp.
2007).
163.

See Rhonda Gay Hartman, Face Value: Challenges of Transplant Technol-

ogy, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 35-41 (2005).
164. Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 108216, 118 Stat. 584 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273a, 274f-1 to -4
(Supp. IV 2004)).
165. The Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act authorizes the
Department of Health and Human Services to allocate funding to states for
developing initiatives, including pilot programs, in furtherance of Congressional policy. Id. For critique and criticism of the Organ Donation and Recovery
Improvement Act, see Patrick D. Carson, The 2004 Organ Donation Recovery and
Improvement Act: How Congress Mssed an Opportunity to Say "Yes" to FinancialIncentives for Organ Donation, 23J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'v 136 (2006).
166. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.34 (West 2006).
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by minors remains largely unregulated. In several important
respects, there are advantages to the policy-making province for
overseeing the protection of adolescents' liberty interests in living donation. Legislatures explicate public values; for medical
donation, they represent a collective judgment about socially
acceptable risks generally and for adolescents particularly. 167 As
to the latter, state policymakers are positioned to express public
policy about tolerable risks that reflect a balance between living
donation and adolescents' liberty interests.
The due process framework for donative decision making by
adolescents must simultaneously produce a principled and workable structure while allowing flexibility in the evolution of
minors' rights. Because legislatures may delineate the scope of
procedural safeguards as well as the substantive content of protectable interests, they may devise a decision-making process that
safeguards adolescents' protected liberty interests against unfair
deprivation and sorts out issues unique to adolescents.
As a subset of minors, adolescents fall within the traditional
parens patriae oversight of state legislatures. Under that concept,
the state protects and promotes adolescents' interests. Such oversight is informed in part by society's interests in adolescents'
development into adults. This includes heightening adolescents'
consciousness about others' plights and how they can benefit
others. This also includes cultivating a sense of altruism for acts
of service that inure to society as a whole. 6 ' To inform policy
judgments, legislators should consider scientific data about adolescents' perception of altruism and how it influences their acts
and their self-image. Data about adolescent decisional capacities
not just for deciding donation but also for dealing with physiological and psychological effects is equally valuable.
Due process essentials for minors in medical donation settings entail normative judgments about informed consent and
the roles of transplant surgeons and institutions. In addition to
traditional lawmaking about child and family matters, state legislatures oversee at once professional practice and adolescents'
decision making in medical settings; 16' a logical extension of that
167. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 70 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("Legislatures are, as this Court has often acknowledged, the 'main guardian' of the public interest, and, within their constitutional competence, their understanding of that interest must be accepted as
'wellnigh' conclusive." (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954))).
168. ORGAN DONATION, supra note 11 ("[A]I1 members of society have a
stake in an adequate supply of organs for patients in need, because each individual is a potential recipient as well as a potential donor.").
169. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-100 (2002).
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oversight is a positive scheme that fosters due process essentials
for adolescents' living donation and also minimizes effects of perceived institutional biases. 7 ° Plainly, institutional approaches to
adolescents' donative decision making should be a matter of
principle, not caprice.
In addition to reducing arbitrary abrogations of minors' liberty interests, legislative schemes signaling cohesive, consistent
approaches to adolescents' liberty interests in medical contexts
promote Gault's principles. In contrast, ad hoc approaches by
medical practitioners and institutions can undermine those principles in significant ways. It seems incontrovertible under Gault
that state-engineered processes for decision making involving
adolescents' protected liberty interests are vital for vindicating
values underlying due process. These values are central to the
state's parens patriae relationship with minors. These values must
have some meaning that transcends the contexts in which they
are applied. Piecemeal, incremental approaches to adolescents'
donative decision making are simply at odds with the Court's
view that the essentials of due process must guide consistently the
way in which the government acts toward minors.' 7 '
Furthermore, retrospective post hoc approaches make it difficult to assess whether a given approach is fair, impartial, and
orderly because it is highly unlikely that acts will occur in factually identical situations. Fairness, impartiality, and orderliness
cannot serve as meaningful standards unless they are articulated
in terms that transcend any given action or context. Although
the difficulty of articulating a coherent model of due process
essentials for any specific decision-making context should not be
underestimated, state legislators are better positioned than doctors, institutions, or even state court judges to delineate the contours of decision-making processes that customize these
essentials. 172

Gault's central focus was not on outcome but on the process
through which state action regarding minors' liberty interests
occurs.' 7 3 This Essay concerns the application of Gault to adolescents' donative decision making-not only about choosing to
give a gift of their bodies to another but also about declining to
170. See Mishra, supra note 114, at 414 (averring the virtues of "a positive
scheme that protects the interests of organ donors, donees, and society in
proper and effective organ transplantation").
171. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 18-22.
172. State courts have expressly deferred to state legislatures as the more
appropriate forum to resolve issues related to minors in medical donation and
decision making. See, e.g., Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 500 (Tex. App. 1979).
173. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 26.
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donate, notwithstanding family pressures to the contrary. Meaningful engagement in discussions during which all relevant considerations are fleshed out must include the opportunity for
adolescents to decline donation and to have that decision
respected. It should also include opportunities to decide whether
to donate to non-relatives who are in need, with the proviso that
parents' views about adolescents' donative desires and about
what they believe best serves adolescents' interests must be
considered.
A primary concern for legislators, therefore, is to ensure
interaction among interested parties in ways that exemplify fairness, impartiality, and orderliness and that enable adolescents to
perceive that they are understood and respected. Simply said,
legislatures should structure how the conversation about living
donation with adolescents should proceed and take shape. Statutes that structure and shield adolescents' decision making about
living donation fulfill parens patriae obligations under Gault by
representing a thoughtful, even-handed approach that instills
confidence about the integrity of the process. However, statutory
guidelines for those conducting a donative decision-making process with adolescents should be implemented in ways tailored to
adolescents' needs and cognitive capacities rather than in a formulaic manner.
Similar to oversight of informed consent between doctors
and patients, legislators ought to establish a framework that
includes the roles and responsibilities of those conducting the
decisional process. Precisely because different deprivations
demand different procedures under due process,1 74 legislatures
must delineate the scope of the procedural safeguards, as well1 as
75
the substantive content of liberty interests in living donation.
The Court also noted implicitly the dignity of adolescents
that finds expression through participatory processes engendering perceptions of fair and respectful treatment. 17 6 Meaningful
discussions with adolescents enable them to sort out the considerations and possible choices. Accordingly, adolescents should
be able to decide to donate a kidney for a relative or to decline to
donate, and that decision in either case should be respected,
absent exceptional circumstances.
174. Id. at 13-15.
175. The Commonwealth of Virginia, for example, acknowledges minors'
liberty interests in end-of-life decision making and affords terminally ill minors
a voice and a decision in their care, including when that care must cease. VA.
CODE ANN.

176.

§ 63.2-100 (2002).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 26.
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As to directed donation for a non-relative, such as a friend
or classmate, adolescents' donative desires should be heard, and
they should be given an opportunity to explore those desires
along with all information pertinent to donative decision making. Adolescents' understandings about altruism are likely realized and enriched when they know that their desires are
respected and that the person to whom they intend to benefit
receives their gift. 17 7 Any statutory scheme for adolescents' dona-

tive decision making should reflect the importance of altruism
underlying laws governing cadaveric donation; but, more importantly, such schemes should be designed to cultivate in adolescents a heightened awareness of selfless acts and a realization of
the value of altruistic behaviors as they develop into adults. 7 8
Law that establishes a process by which adolescents' liberty
interests in living donation are both promoted and protected
advances Gault's principles in ways that resonate meaningfully
with those in this age group. As the Court in Gault stressed,
" [T] he appearance as well as the actuality of fairness, impartiality
and orderliness-in short the essentials of due process-may be
more impressive and therapeutic" from the perspective of adolescents, regardless of the ultimate outcome.
In short, the Court in Gault pronounced that the Due Process Clause applies whenever state action seeks to deprive minors
of life, liberty, or property. The flexibility and underlying values
of due process endure, and thus the legislative-and judicialtask is to translate Gault's due process requirements into other
contexts implicating minors' protected interests. Specifically,
state legislatures can apply the due process framework formulated by Gault to different settings and, in so doing, assess the
manner in which the underlying values may best be realized
for-and by-adolescents.
Among specific considerations for legislators in living donation settings are the adequacy of process to protect adolescents'
interests and how policy should be constructed to optimize adolescents' engagement in altruistic actions. State actions that
exclude adolescents from living donation or unduly constrain
their decision making about living donation trivialize Gault's declaration that due process is not just for adults.18 ° What are
needed, therefore, are legislative models that embrace Gault in
various contexts for adolescent decision making and that adhere
177.
178.
179.
180.

See Mishra, supra note 114, at 410.
See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 26.
Id. at 13.
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to Gault's principles for states' responsiveness to adolescents and
to their liberty interests in matters of significance to them-and,
in living donation, of significance to others.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Gault, recognizing youths'
constitutionally protected interests as well as the state's role as
parens patriae to facilitate those interests through fair, impartial,
and orderly processes, was a renaissance moment. The due process essentials recognized by the Court then are viable now in
decision-making matters that affect the lives of minors. Decisions
to be living donors of vital tissues such as kidneys have potentially
serious, significant, short- and long-term impacts on adolescents.
Adolescents also derive meaning and self-worth from donative
decision making about profoundly personal gifts for the benefit
of other persons. Thus, state-engineered schemes suffused with
the principles of Gault are essential to ensure that adolescents'
liberty interests are both recognized and respected.
Simply put, this Essay offers a new way of thinking about
adolescents as living donors and particularly describes how to
think comprehensively about the related issues in ways that are
compatible with the unifying principles of Gault. With the advent
of living donation due to both medical advances and advantages,
and a living-donor base that is expanding to include adolescents,
transplantation policy and its complexities must not ignore adolescents as living donors. The law's recognition of a fair and
meaningful process that enables adolescents' decision making
about matters of significance to their lives and the personal dignity found therein should be a lasting legacy of Gault.

